Case 3000 questions
It will be terminated at the indictment.
Exciting, but not the most important thing in this case. Regarding suspicion of any kind of illegal activity, it is justifiable whether the problem is regarded as a criminal activity beyond good. This is naturally a police investigator and indicted bread and butter. However, the issue raised by the submarine incident is related to a wide range of important issues. How decisions are made about vast security consequences.
There are at least six problems. The first question is whether Israel knew that it could add a total of nine submarines to secure three additional submarines. However, the decision was decided entirely by the decision of Defense Minister Moshe Ya. Three additional submarines would replace three older submarines.
Nine submarines are far beyond our need and ability to maintain. What does that look like?
The second issue is why should a decision be made so quickly before an existing submarine becomes useless? The Cabinet approves the Gideon program, which is the military's multi-year plan, and then makes the decision beyond the scope of the plan.
The third issue is that the Defense Secretary claimed that the prime minister, without his knowledge, had asked Germany to buy two ships capable of detecting submarines. This is similar to the Prime Minister's request to purchase another F-15 Squadron in the US without the knowledge of Defense Secretary, Chief of Staff and Air Force Commander.
In connection with these three issues, it is worth emphasizing that the purpose of the multi-year plan for the defense industry is to ensure maximum security in a particular budget. It is possible and necessary to discuss the optimal balance. It is unreasonable, however, to make sporadic decisions without understanding the total replacement price, and this can not be determined before carrying out in-depth studies and does not have to be passed on to other countries. Internal debate among Israeli decision makers.
The fourth issue is even more serious. Unlike bid cancellations and submarines for the purchase of vessels to protect Israeli naval economic zones, unilateral decisions to buy the vessel at ThyssenKrup have no obvious advantage in this area.
In the end, I started to buy bigger (and more expensive) vessels than I needed at first. In fact, it is better to do a deal between two weeks (eg a GTG deal) without bidding, but in this case I promise to buy equipments of similar value to Israel in other states. It is not what happened here, and it is clear that the unusual pressures have led to a perplexing decision.
The fifth issue concerns an unusual request for a privatization of a naval shipyard by a German company to the Histadrut trade union. Considering that the shipyard is the property of IDF, it is necessary to negotiate with the landlord to negotiate the property purchase. Who knew this and who collaborated with it?
The sixth issue, and most worrisome, is that Israeli officials have not opposed Chancellor Angela Merkel to Germany, which sells luxury submarines to Egypt without knowledge of the Defense Secretary.
Indeed, there is no criminal aspect to these issues, but should we investigate these issues only through the crime prism? Do the police have the data, experience and motivation to investigate this?
These include issues related to two entirely different areas: foreign policy and security, and the way the Israeli government operates (including the boundaries of responsibility among different parties).
Problems reviewed in Case-3000 without underestimating the severity of criminal cases – military strategic procurement processes and decision-making methods – are less important.